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This is what, as I see all these memories now have been released by this basic

whole new re-orientation around the survivor idea so I thought very fruitfully

now about that whole period, and what comes back to me now is that I saw myself

as recurrently being forced to play Russian roulette in the sense of undertaking

concerts where I had almost everything to lose and nothing to win, namely that

if I didn't perform well in front of an audience, my whole relation with my mother

is jeopardized, which meant my whole identity, everything that I depended on in

life, my whole self-respect, everything was at stake. If I proved to be an

inadequate pianist, I was dead as far as my mother was concerned and that, by the

way, was a real--that was real--according to all of (inaudible -interruption).

So you were living dangerously all the time, in terms of her approval.

I was living very dangerously.

/Not when I was practicing but every concert was extremely dangerous. It couldn't

do much for me, but it could be disastrous if I did badly enough to make it look

as though I wasn't going to be a pianist, my relation with my mother would be dead

and that came up about twice a year.

Do you remember the terror?

Yeah, I remember the terror about playing. I suppose that I didn't associate it,

you know, in just these terms but, sure. So the point is though it isn't just

terror; I got used to being stoic about this. You had to do it and I was playing

literally Russian roulette, two, three or four times a year. I'd go in there, I'd

do it. I couldn't just back away from it. That would be disastrous. I couldn't

just say, I won't do it, that's suicide so better than suicide is Russian roulette

so I got used to Russian roulette and when you practice risk-taking that often

and regularly, you get accomplished at it and risks don't bother you anymore. If

you get real rusty at it, it's--you get nervous about it. So that it was my

destiny to be prepared to sacrifice myself for other people or to risk everything

for somebody else. It was just part of the way I lived and then all the guilts

and all the ambivalences that were related to the accident just reconfirmed that--

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KDE

The 4th
following
be Dan &
Harris
Cantover?

I see
Publishing
over as
Same?
(writing
itself?)

M

Ellsberg

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Ellsberg

MB-G Copy

(on tape)

Dear Compañero -
I send this to
Remind you of general points
that might be useful for
current piece -

I have no
idea what this
stuff is doing
here

M.
12/23/84

Have a
good holiday!

not going to meet he
speculations.

you know, afterwards. So I just noticed when I was doing mountain climbing, when I was 15 and 16, I appeared--by the way, I have a coat here. I appeared to be fearless--you know, like being color-blind--but I just noticed that I was able to do mountain climbing by myself--very dangerous routes--
Before you were 15 even.

Ellsberg Actually, this is after the accident so you know it was related to...

Do you know where Dr. Ellsberg's coat would be?

Ellsberg Oh, I got this too, there is that. (Inaudible) totally misleading the nature of reality as to who you are, what you're meant to do, what's going on, what their interests are; second, they are capable of falling asleep at the wheel, they are capable of carrying out terrible crimes, like Harry Truman, or terrible accidents like my father--all of this is consistent with their being with their meriting your general love and loyalty and trust, and everything else up to a point but (laughter) you should also be prepared to realize that there are times when your own integrity demands if you're going to be what you really believe--you've got to repose yourself for those authorities so I had in other words the kind of...without any political radicalism in my backbone... (my father is very conservative.) I had the kind of potential distrust of our authorities...let's say the child of Communist parents he grows up with...as an absolute matter-of-fact assumption and I've just found this by knowing children who had Communist parents....well, they don't believe anything the President says so it was very easy for them to say to...they didn't accept their parents' radicalism, on the whole, and they thought their parents were full of shit but they understood and they didn't have any trust in Russia, but also they were never taken in by Vietnam or Korea say from the beginning. I was, but still I was capable ultimately of perceiving what other people weren't perceiving which was these authorities are acting for themselves. So that's it, I think, and then when it came to the question of what to do about it...see, here I was...I was a guy who...and this I was somewhat proud of, actually...the following fact.

There were a dozen people who had the Pentagon papers. Most of them, like *Clark* Clifford or McNamara or (inaudible) Okay, there were a dozen people who had the Pentagon papers. Most of them could have put out the Pentagon Papers with full authority, especially for McNamara or Clifford, and with very little... no legal risk and very little political risk, but a little risk. Everybody who knew me...and I on the other hand was known to be...my life was based on discretion on keeping secrets...I'd had a dozen clearances higher than top secret...clearances of which...almost none of my colleagues around knew that such clearances existed and that means my closest friend didn't know that such clearances existed. That's how good the secret system is, and that means you have to keep secrets from your closest friend to make that work. I was understood to be a person who had no need to tell...I could keep a secret and I did keep secrets and I had no great friends among...I, in fact, had ...I had, in fact, leaked on one occasion in my life, in 1968, but nobody knew that so, in fact, as far as anybody knew, there was no reason to believe I had ever leaked out, and yet when the Pentagon Papers came out--as far as I have been able to tell everybody who knew I'd had access to those papers knew who had given them and the reason is very simple...they knew who the others were and as I said they knew there was only one guy who had the guts to do that. And I was proud of that reaction, but there was the point which was...I was just known as a risk taker as one...somebody who's, if necessary...or even if not necessary... There is an element that you hinted at a little bit here about...that relates to this business of authority...that authority has clay feet...you, you, clearly, ahh....or has its limitations and is not sacred...you spoke too clearly but you still have to re-create something higher...some other authority...you mentioned the family...you were holding a family together...but you said the public in the place of...

Ellsberg

In case of Vietnam, there were several loyalties involved and, by the way, it's very commonly thought that the...my major concern...this is what Harrison

Salisbury says...what sickened me was the lying...this is just absurd...I've lived with lying all my bureaucratic life...you know, and I wasn't planning to go to jail for 115 years just to...so that I could get the truth off my chest or enlighten some people for their interest. I was trying to change a war going on so it was the substance of what was being concealed.

And how high the stakes were.

Ellsberg The loyalties definitely included a feeling of loyalty to the Vietnamese people. ...absolutely wrong to be imposing a war on them that they didn't want...when they wanted that war over and that was...I won't say, I can't say which was highest in my mind but that was among the highest loyalties...definitely again then to the American soldiers who were dying over there...well, say the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese we were killing....I was very, very conscious of the deaths we were causing and that was, of course, larger in scale, much larger in scale than our own soldiers deaths, but so I put third our soldiers deaths, as a matter of fact, and that should be ended and above all, too, a concept of our country and what our country should be doing in the world. In fact, I've always, for instance, responded to--I've never told anyone this, as a matter of fact, that the first page of de Gaulle's memoirs...and I can't say them exactly...but the first sentence is like this...I have lived always with a certain concept of my country, of France.

What's the concept...of your country.

Ellsberg I always liked that sentence and I felt that's like me and I had a very strong sense of America (pause for show of emotion)...America should not be doing this... so it was a very patriotic...

Can you, can you define that at all, I mean as painful as it is.

Ellsberg America should be much closer to what we told ourselves we are, that we should be supporting freedom, self-determination and human rights, protecting people from aggression and stand for international law and principles, all these things that we say we do.

_____ All the things they teach you over here, right where we're heading right now.

Ellsberg Well, no, it's not what they teach over here...what they teach over here in Harvard is how to run an empire...

_____ Ahhh...

Ellsberg And how to do it with people who don't understand the requirements of the job.
_____ So where...these other ideals came from where...

Ellsberg I really do believe that about Harvard.

_____ So what you are talking about America came from...Cranbrook.

Ellsberg Came from grade school. At Harvard, you learn...Cranbrook gave me/^apretty good sense of that...grade school, but Harvard...

_____ But Cranbrook was after grade school.

Ellsberg But Harvard teaches you much more sophisticated views of how the world is and what the requirements of power are, the obligations of power and what you have to go along with for fear of worse...

_____ Was there a particular teacher in grade school or was it...I mean, because a lot of people get those ideals in grade school and they don't have such a powerful...

Ellsberg I think my tutor here was actually the second world war...was the propaganda in the newsreels...we were the natural country to be with the polar opposite of Nazi Germany. I wasn't very concerned about the Japanese. My concern was never to be like the Nazis, to be the opposite of the Nazis and they say, for some reason, I never thought of Nazihood as being an existentially impossible condition for America, that it was something to be avoided. I thought that it was something we must practice not being and avoid, and things like Sinclair Lewis', It Can't Happen Here, or (inaudible) 1984...it could happen here and we must not let it happen.

_____ And you saw it happening.

Ellsberg I saw it happening? (Sobbing)

_____ I've got to pull over here. That's the building.

Ellsberg In those days, it was entirely unknown to civilians, including the Secretary of Defense which is another story which I won't go into now, but it was a purely military domain, and by 1960 or so, I was probably the only civilian...no one known to me...I think I was the only one who actually knew our war plans, our nuclear war plans in detail. (inaudible) and I have never seen such plans, people like (inaudible)

Can I interrupt you about the...I'm a predecessor of yours and you're talking about '60...that would be 14 years...

Ellsberg I remember you did work at Rand, did you not?

No, I worked at (inaudible) headquarters there...

Ellsberg Oh, I didn't know that.

We had polished off Japan (inaudible) afterwards, naturally I was looking for something to do (inaudible) which would be (inaudible) in the event that the Russians attacked (inaudible) Western Europe which at that time/just about defenseless and the estimate was that there was no way to prevent them from running right up to the English Channel so they devised a response which consisted of using B-29s...the great warship of the air in those days to drop nuclear bombs on virtually every capital city in Europe (inaudible) some of my colleagues did. (laughter) (inaudible) We did have that emergency war plan scrubbed by appearing to...Vandenberg who was then chief of the air staff. (inaudible)

Ellsberg Well, this is extremely interesting. First of all, you were a civilian at the time.

Oh, yeah.

Ellsberg And what had you been doing, operations analysis beforehand, or something like that?

That's right.

Ellsberg When I say the only civilian who knew the structure of these things, actually I have in mind some exceptions that I ran into in the late 50s who were in the structure

here and there...were civilians, operations analysts who worked on this or that aspect. They did some evaluation of plans, that's true. That's right, actually, I really hadn't thought of Wessig(?). I was thinking at the highest level where typically they didn't use these operations analysts, but Wessig did see the plans at the highest level. You're quite right. Some of them. This is very interesting because the plans you're talking about have just begun being declassified. There are the kinds of things that one wouldn't expect ever to be classified, but it has worked out with the Freedom of Information Act that the plans are the kind that normally, you know, (inaudible) that would never have been declassified and there is an extraordinary amount available now and a guy named David Rosenberg at the University of Houston has been working in those archives and he was the one who got most of them declassified...he has a clearance (inaudible)so he sees it from both sides. He got it declassified and he has a piece in International Security of Winter '81-82 on plans of the mid-50s which included Wessig report (?) but he has a...in the latest issue which is coming out March 15 the plans from '45-'60 which would probably include the ones you're talking about and it's really an extraordinary piece. It's a marvelous long piece, the longest thing International Security has ever done, about 70 pages. It's really interesting. So now, could I pursue that because now I've read those, thanks to him. I've read some of these back-up plans and so forth. What year was that?

That would be probably '47.

Ellsberg How late did you stay in? After the war?

That's how I conveyed it. (Inaudible)

EB-G (Laughter)

Ellsberg Now '47 would probably have been a plan called Pinscher (?). Do you remember a code name for that. Well, he's got, you know, one by one all the plans basically, but now in what sense do...what makes you think or in what sense...in what basis did you get somebody to scrub it because this is the nature of the plan.

Before he had signed off...explained to him...

Ellsberg What did you say was wrong with it?

(inaudible) I said that it would make the (inaudible) reconstruct...

there was no way he could manage. (inaudible) I had no substitute but he recognized that (inaudible)

Ellsberg And what did they do then as far as you know?

That's what I said (inaudible)

Ellsberg Well, let me tell you...I hate to tell you this (laughter)
the

Before you tell him, can I ask what/point of it was supposed to be?

Of laying waste to capitals and

You'll have to ask the people who wrote it...

Ellsberg Wait a minute...you're not saying, or did I hear something...didn't you say
Russia or did you say all Western....

All Western....They had (inaudible) Paris, Berlin, Vienna.

Ellsberg On the assumption the Russians had occupied...

On the assumption they would then be occupied. Yeah.

Ellsberg Ohh! That's one I hadn't heard. I didn't hear you...I put it into the framework
of what I did know already too quickly. You did run across a very interesting
plan. (laughter) The fact is that the closest I know to that...which is only
named
moderately close...is that a Nato courier/ Johnson defected to the Soviets in
1962 and he took with him a whole set of the Nato war plans...'62...it wasn't
a big secret to the Russians from then on. They got very thorough plans but the
in
Russians began to feed back to Nato capitals ever since then/ various crises
they feed back the Johnson war plan and nobody has ever contradicted these
plans...now these are Nato war plans which on the whole I didn't see.....target...
but I do know that they corresponded exactly to the higher level war plans that
I did know at the time, and what created great interest in Nato at the time,
especially when they did this recently, was that there were a lot of German

targets, or Nato targets but they didn't include capitals, but they were air fields, which you have to expect, naturally, in any such war...they are going to take out all the air fields and...at least their target, they're prepared to take them out so the Danes and the Dutch and the Germans were very interested to see that there was German coordinates in the war plans. That was really quite interesting. Actually, I think they found it so incredible that it didn't have that big a political impact. People thought...it was known to be coming from the Russians and I could see that that was almost surely accurate when I looked at it. But I know...I talked to people (inaudible) and they couldn't take it fully seriously...they didn't know what they had here but it didn't have capitals on...that really interested me.

We were still in the Russian syndrome, but that's what you did with the...

Ellsberg Yeah. Well, however, now here's what I thought you were going to say and here's what the plans...so you probably were right. He probably did change that, for all I know, but the plan that I saw in 1959-60 was a plan...was the single plan the United States had for fighting Russians under any circumstances and this reflected a decade of new look and the new look (inaudible) the alliance on nuclear weapons...Eisenhower's political economy and work here is believed to ...Eisenhower's first political guidance for the war plan modified the Truman guidance in the following way: the Truman guidance for the war plans started with the statement, the No. 1 threat is the Soviet Union...let's say the late Truman...by the end of Truman's regime...from the nuclear capability and their threat against Western Europe and that was the No. 1 threat facing the United States and then it goes on to other Soviet threats. Eisenhower, in '53, changed that to the following sentence: "The two major threats facing the United States (and the threat posed the U.S. interest by Soviet Union possession of a nuclear capability and general activity and so forth, and second, on an equal level, the threat posed to our economy by the necessity to deal with the first threat, and Humphrey's fear

of inflation and the fact that depression would follow inflation led Eisenhower not only rhetorically...Top Secret document...but in practice to give extremely high priority to limiting the money spent on national defense, there having been fourfold increase in the defense budget, thanks to Paul ^{NITZ} ~~Nitza~~ (?) and others around the time that the Korean War started and association with (inaudible) so the defense budget had gone from 13 billion going toward 9 or 10 billion... it was (inaudible) to get it down to 10 billion. It suddenly went...in 18 months, it went to over 40 billion where it stayed from then on, but Eisenhower's ambition....his determination was to keep it from going much above 40 billion, despite what was seen as a growing Soviet threat and the result of that was that Eisenhower himself went along with an Air Force project designed to give the Air Force predominance among the services and to allow a big Air Force, that there wouldn't be much but an Air Force, so the Eisenhower Air Force project was then to cut back...to break through the one third, one third, one third type of allocation and give the Air Force something that sometimes went up as high as 40-45% of the budget, cutting back the others. This led to a plan for operational use which precluded explicitly any form of limited war with the Soviet Union and under any circumstances, meaning neither limited conventional nor limited nuclear war. [There was only one form of planning and preparing for conflict with the Soviet Union, armed conflict with the Soviet Union and that was an all-out attack including the full use of SAC against a predetermined target list. Armed conflict is defined as not including patrols skirmishes in the Berlin (inaudible) a platoon or two or maybe a battalion or two. It was anything higher than that, if anything that must be assumed to be directed by Soviet authority, so/it involved (inaudible) so if it was a regiment or more (inaudible) there was a single plan for armed conflict with the Soviet Union anywhere in the world, Iran, Cuba where they turned up the next year, Berlin Corridor, uprising satellites that the Westerns got involved in. However it arose, "in such circumstances, the general war plan will be executed." And the general war plan called for as quickly as

possible and simultaneously as possible using all available forces, keeping no reserves, expending all...the entire stockpile of thermonuclear weapons on every city in the Soviet Union, every military base that they had weapons left for and every city in China because there was no plan whatever for a war with Russia that did not include the destruction of China, known as the _____ Soviet block (although by '60 that was already, you know, very much in question. In fact, was not really a reality, but it was still assumed to be a _____ Soviet ^{block} block) so you get all this. This was...

_____ What was (inaudible)

Ellsberg What? This is the operational plan. The war did not arrive. We didn't fight. For example, in 1960 or '61, Khrushchev did not carry out his absolute unequivocal promise to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by the end of 1961, and which would result, he said, in the Germans then taking control of the Corridor and we expected them, to mean that they would close or interfere with access to the Corridor in which case, our contingency plans called for threatening that on the ground, but since there were seven Soviet divisions in the immediate vicinity of Berlin, we would not...any force we sent in there that we were able to send in there could be surrounded and overwhelmed by that, in which case we could only initiate nuclear war and there was no plan for initiating anything but all-out nuclear war. Now...

_____ Is it assumed that this plan was known to the Soviets?

Ellsberg Well, this was what they publicly said it was...I mean, it was basically what we said. Of course, most Democrats and most people assumed that Dulles was being very rhetorical about all this. What I'm saying is that massive retaliation was not just Dulles sounding off, that slogan, that program was embodied in the actual operational plans, the training, the SOP's, the deployment of our weapons all over the world.

_____ My question was this plan ...for its threat value and to have the threat value (inaudible) but as some hostile reaction.

By the way, this does get to the subject you were...let me name a broad subject into which this falls and I'm just going through all of this for historical (inaudible) There is a theoretical aspect to this, if people are interested. I want to propose from my knowledge of planning as applied to the later periods because thanks now to people like Desmond Ball (?) and David Rosenberg, and whatnot, an extraordinary amount is now knowable about ____ China in a way it was never notable to the outside for a number of reasons. There is a lot more that is quite well known about what the ____ plans. Extraordinarily, they seem to be similar to the plans of 1961 and that is more true than they were in the intervening period of about 1970, so it turns out that my knowledge of the plans did not erode totally with time as I expected them to. I would have thought that what I knew about the plans ____ would have been totally irrelevant by the time the Russians got ____ missiles and submarines that would require a different structure. That has not turned out to be (inaudible) . I was just talking to the PSR, Positions for Social Responsibility telling them I felt that the understanding of the arms race on which they operated is, I thought, an inadequate one. So let me present it briefly, a different approach. In answer to your question, I think, well, first, I think that the structure of our weapons and our plan and our declaratory policy in fact serves as system/ threats, a strategy of threats--I call it a system of threats actually because it's threats backing up threats and actions that are meant to affect the credibility of layer upon layer of threats, so one can call it deterrence but it's a rather complex form of deterrence, and if certain forms of deterrence fail and certain actions have to be carried out, there are other things that deter you, other objectives to be met by this and a great deal then, I believe, of what we do in the way of buying weapons, designing weapons, (inaudible) and talking about them is meant not to fight a war--certainly a large scale war, if possible--but to have a real world effect upon events and in fact bargaining at low levels of conflict and the peripheral confrontations in the world. A lot of this is explicit in the current administration, but I

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think they are only making explicit weapons in privately (inaudible) for a whole generation here, and that is the belief--if they are implementing a belief that confrontations not only with the Soviets but even more with the clients of the Soviets or potential liberation forces--Third World forces of various kinds--around the world...confrontations like that are avoided or managed or won in part by the manipulation of the structure of our nuclear and other military (inaudible) that appear to be designed for high levels of conflict and our ability to escalate a nuclear war or even to fight a nuclear war, the fighting particularly, has an impact on the likelihood that we will be challenged or successfully challenged in non-nuclear conference or a crisis--that is the belief (inaudible) and I'll go further and say, and I say this belief gives what these various administrations do much more coherence than the point of view of their strategic objective and is usually credited (inaudible) by outsiders and even critics, especially critics, and also much more continuity, and if the continuity across administrations is not merely a product of bureaucratic inertia or anachronism, but of a fairly constant set of perceptions of U.S. interests and how to meet those interests, and specifically it is not as -- if I can give an example as sort of a Chinese school emphasis on bureaucratic politics would suggest or as most arms control (inaudible) I think that what we buy and what we do with the weapons we buy is not to be understood only or mainly as the result of a fairly incoherent and complex set of pressures within the bureaucracy and within the domestic economy that have no relation (inaudible) and have no centralized direction. I think this is the basic model of the arms race, that the arms control association works with, including, you know, people whose efforts I respect very much but I mean people like (inaudible) work with publicly at least the kind of basic model of the arms race that it is produced essentially by domestic pressure on both sides both in Russia and the U.S. The key concept here is (inaudible) the only imaginable, legitimate and really the only effective function one can think of for nuclear weapons is to deter their use by an opponent,

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"interactions"

in the light of that single imaginable objective it seems fairly evident that we undermined in various ways by the kinds of weapons we buy and we buy a lot more weapons than can possibly be justified by that approach, so people who start with that notion of our objective then are led to look for some other reason why we're buying all these weapons and they come up with the motives of the weapons laboratories, you know, careerism, an ideological commitment to nuclear weapons, profits of the manufacturers, votes to the congressman whose districts (inaudible) various bureaucratic pressures that generate this mountain of weapons. I don't think that's true. I ^{don't} think that's the main reason, although obviously these things all so operate and all are a part of it, and I think to repeat what I said a minute ago that there is among other things, there is, in fact, a coherent strategy and _____ conception which these weapons serve. On the U.S. side and a fairly new hypothesis for me is because it's new that the Russians are coming to look very similar to our posture institutionally and in the weapons they are actually buying. I'm prepared to conjecture that the aims and conceptions on the Russian side are similar or might be similar to those that I see on our side, and that's not obvious because my own understanding of what we are doing is an unusual one and to attribute that to the Russians is even more unusual and it's more projectual, as far as I'm concerned personally. It's from outside, in that case as far as I'm concerned. What I say is happening is that from '45 on our leaders have felt that American interests involved worldwide involve us in a need to not only exercise financial influence and CIA type of influence which are major tools for us, starting with financial and industrial and commercial pressures which we can (inaudible) Russians or anybody else, but that to back up those interests of various kinds, largely in the third world, but we also have to be prepared to provide a U.S. troop presence, not only in Europe but expeditionary forces elsewhere and that these vital interests which justify which are defined by justifying U.S. intervention far around the world and various places, like Vietnam and Korea, as well as (inaudible) have to be backed

up because they can so easily be overwhelmed by local forces so far from our shores, have to be backed up by a willingness and a readiness to support those troops with nuclear weapons when necessary, not just routinely, although actually Eisenhower who was never challenged on this too much did come close to visioning a routine use if we got involved but we weren't too involved under Eisenhower, but on the whole what I discovered fairly recently actually, separately from my knowledge of the war plan was that, in fact, we have made first use threats a number of times and this is in this--how many of you have seen this paper, The Call to Mutiny, it's the introduction to Protest and Survive by Edward Thompson (?) and it came out in Monthly Review. I'll leave a copy. That shows a pattern of threats of first use of tactical nuclear weapons a dozen times or so since '45, most of them secret at the time, some not.

How can threats be secret?

Ellsberg Secret obviously not from the opponent but the opponent's shared with us the secrecy because in most cases they back down and were not anxious to publicize that fact so they kept the secret just as Khrushchchev kept the secret of our U-2 flights which he couldn't shoot down. It wasn't in his interest to reveal that he was not able to do anything about this U-2 flight so he collaborated with us on the secrecy of it and virtually all of these people have refrained from legitimizing nuclear threats by doing what they could have done, say we've just gotten a nuclear threat, this is outrageous, and so on and so forth. The fact is that in most cases, the opponent did back down or at least the threat wasn't triggered and this includes, for instance, Korea, '53, where Eisenhower believes that it was actual nuclear threat that caused the Chinese to accept his terms at ^{Panama (2) 8} at/(inaudible)

Now a lot of people who know that he said that in his memoirs seven years after the event, eight years, I think, have dismissed it on the grounds and said, well, there were a lot of other reasons for the Chinese to back down, Stalin had just died, this, this and that, so they tossed it aside and paid very little attention to the fact attested by everyone who knew Eisenhower, Sherman Adams and various

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in 1960
(Dadalus)

chiefs of staff, including Eisenhower. He believed that the threat had been effective which is pretty significant--that's in '53, his first months in office, when it comes to deciding what to do in the next confrontation and he indeed use such threats in '55 in the Tatron? Islands dispute and in '58 very seriously (inaudible) Morton (?) one thing that really put me on the track of this was Mort Halperin's top secret study of the _____ Crisis in '58 where it was evident that we had come probably closer to actual nuclear war than at any other time in the whole period. The Chinese did back down but since we didn't expect them to do it, we weren't sure they would do it and there is no evident reason why they did, other than the threat, so in this case, again, Eisenhower certainly believed the threats had succeeded. He was very (inaudible). He, I think, was quite determined to carry them out, the Chinese knew it and now we get into one other factor as to, you see, why the threats weren't carried out. The first point is that in nearly every case, Korea, Korea '53, Tatron? Islands '55, ~~Komei~~ ^{Guam} '58, Caison? '68, where threats were made like this...the opponent either backed down or the threat wasn't triggered. In '54, we offered nuclear weapons to the French for the defense of ~~Deauville~~ ^{Da Nang} Phu? when they were surrounded. They were taken but that was because the French turned down the weapons because they felt the Chinese were too close to their troops and their troops would be endangered and they feared retaliation so it doesn't disprove the rule. Now I see again these threats are still being made, newly being made now but I want to deal with this more abstractly than I usually do since I don't usually have the occasion to do these things.

What do you think then (inaudible) threat is made ...

Ellsberg What do I think...ahh...when is it made?

Back in '59 when some company was....

Ellsberg Yes, exactly, I mean good question? Actually I found that if you take the dozen or so threats we know of, and by the way there is a new article, International

Security, on threats made on both sides in '73 which is new data based on interviews in the '73 war. It fits the pattern exactly...the Arab-Israeli War. Apparently the Israelis made the threat, the Soviets seemed to have made a threat, and we made a threat and the...what it fits into exactly two situations...they all fit into one of two categories, namely, when an American or allied unit was surrounded and in danger of being overrun, a major tactical defeat, not a battalion, something higher than that, not too big, a couple of regiments or something, every time that happened, seven or eight times, the American president prepared plans for imminent use of nuclear weapons and on several of those occasions, we know that he communicated those plans to the opponent, and on the other occasions we know that he leaked them to the press so they did get to the opponent, and also preparations were visible to the opponent and so forth; in fact, more visible to the opponent than to the public. The other occasion was two, twice, when there was a long stalemated war, a new president coming in, Eisenhower in '53, Nixon in '69, who had been Eisenhower's Vice President during three or four of these previous episodes, Korea, Dien Bien Phu, Lebanon, which I didn't get into in '58 and which amazingly enough involved nuclear planning. Now what the nuclear planning was? Not Lebanon, the key emphasis in Lebanon was--remember there had been an uprising, an unexpected leftist uprising in Iraq just before that...sent everybody into a panic. They hadn't expected this at all. Shimon? had been asking for help for sometime in connection with his troubles so they used the excuse of Shimon to get troops into the Middle East very fast in Lebanon, but the real focus was on Iraq. The British, however, were to keep the main watch on Iraq if it was needed to put troops into Iraq--we were to be in the area in Lebanon--but it turns out that the worst fear that they had at that time was that the Iraqis would move into Kuwait and there was no mincing of words of what they were worried about in Kuwait--the oil of Kuwait. Eisenhower authorized Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prepare plans to use nuclear weapons against the Iraqis if they should go into Kuwait, which, you know, in terms of

The
B-52's
Civilian
Manned
in 1962

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current preoccupation, it is a very interesting little piece of history back in '58 and as somebody who lived through that, I had just left the Marines at that point--I had been in Suez the year before and was following all that pretty closely. I certainly didn't care a whole lot about Kuwait in the papers at that point or even Iraq as our concern but that turns out to be a major concern...so Nixon had been through all this and Nixon...Haldeman reports then and this has been confirmed then by other people since then that Nixon came into office determined to end the Vietnam War...to win it, actually...the way Eisenhower had ended the Korean War by threatening, as Haldeman puts it, massive escalation with the possible use of nuclear weapons. Now Eisenhower had not threatened the possible use, he had threatened definite use. Nixon, on the other hand, did prepare target folders and plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons, he said possible use, but he didn't carry out (inaudible) but now let me say once one realizes--let me just follow this model for a minute, but I'll attach it to reality to this extent--when you realize that presidents have had occasion to make such threats a number of times..as I say generally secretly, the threats were relatively explicit over Berlin and as a possible contingency with the Cuban Crisis but in the other cases, it tended not to be known anymore than assassination efforts tended to be known, even within the bureaucracy...very closely held lest people worry. No crowing was done over our successes. Second, they did believe they had been successful which was why they kept doing it. When you see that, I then turned (inaudible) to say, could this have some bearing on what else they do in the field of nuclear weapons and now you can begin to see the kind of coherence to the kinds of weapons they buy and when they buy them, the urgency that they buy them, and so forth, so I'll just suggest as a hypothetical model which I believe is a very realistic one, that in fact the kinds of weapons designed and bought are not simply suggested by the technology available. The directions in which potential technology is exploited can be explained as efforts to make as credible as possible U.S. willingness to escalate a nuclear war if the Soviets should choose

to make that nuclear war two-sided. In other words, efforts to deter the Soviets from retaliation to the use of nuclear weapons in a tactical situation, mostly in the Third World, against a Soviet client, to produce, in other words, exactly the situation which was achieved almost unquestionably in 1958 when the Soviets did not feel able to comply with the Chinese request for an assurance that if the U.S. used nuclear weapons against the _____ Crisis, the Russians would retaliate. Second, the Chinese asked, according to the Chinese, for two or three small weapons that they could control themselves. They wanted two things, Russian backup and their own couple of weapons, and the Russians refused both of those and this led to very bad feelings, / ^{and} the following year is when the Russians pulled out their nuclear technicians from China and others in the Russian-China split had a lot to do with that, with this success by the U.S. Well, the objective is to assure that that happens in the future.

_____ Are you suggesting that from the point of view of the (inaudible) United States against (inaudible) together with the possibility of retaliation by the Soviet Union and further retaliation then by the United States...there is no (inaudible) It's just the right number.

Ellsberg Well, no, put it another way. Do the Russians have too many tanks? We keep saying they have too many tanks for their own defense...for their own defense of what? For their own defense of East Europe? What those tanks have been used for is to intimidate and put down the _____ in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and recently in Poland on their borders. Do they have too many for that purpose? How can you have too many when twice as many would be better? If what you're trying to do is trying to assure that people don't challenge you by posing them with the likelihood of overwhelming power if they do challenge you, you can't have too many. I'm saying that if you are trying...if you have in mind making first use threats not promiscuously, not when not necessary, but in desperate situations where the necessity is the necessity to avoid prolonging a stalemate in war or

to...a necessity is to avoid a tactical defeat of a U.S. or allied unit. It's just that. It's not less than that, but it's just that. If it's your intent to use nuclear weapons against an ally of the Soviet Union which has been our target in every case. In a world where the Soviets have 20,000 nuclear weapons to land or use, you can't have too many nuclear weapons and the kind you want are precisely the kind we keep designing or buying, not some other kind. For example, but I'm saying this is conception which in my mind...think as a hypothesis...what?

(inaudible) what type of weapons (inaudible)

Ellsberg All right, now we'll get to that...use the model. At least what I'm saying clear enough now as a proposition? So let's see, what kind of weapons would that

X generate, let's say, and see how it fits. All right. Now I'll give one....
an aspect of this....first of all, let me mention...let me make...I think it

will simplify things in our minds if I make a few conceptual distinctions here that I usually make...I will use first use to refer to...I'll use first strike to refer to essentially a disarming strike against strategic forces, the long-range forces...I'll be specific, the Soviet Union for the U.S. The U.S. first strike then will be our best effort to disarm the Soviet Union and do whatever else we do in accompaniment of that, maybe hit cities or whatever else we do.

9 || A first use, then, will be initiation of nuclear war other than that, typically

then use of tactical weapons whether against Soviets in Europe, let's say, or

in Iran or against a Soviet ally, whoever else we're fighting...that I'll call

first use. In first strikes, let me mention three different circumstances in which a first strike could take place. There are names for two of these, although the main one has never had a name of its own which leads to obscurity in our discussion. It could be essentially "out of the blue", the first strike could be the first use. It could be the beginning of conflict, a surprise attack, like the Pearl Harbor attack. To my knowledge, that has never been espoused by any president or plan at a high level, although it's actually been proposed from

ET assumes this is USSR's best bet

time to time by surprising high level people. Symington once proposed it in early 1951... _____100 when he was head of Defense Mobilization and various generals have proposed it from time to time (inaudible) _____was always known to be partial to it, but the fact is that has never been U.S. policy and when the presidents say we do not have a first strike policy and thus our weapons are not first strike weapons, this is what they're ruling out, this use. By the way, as far as we know, the Russians have never planned such a thing either. And this is what their ruling out when they say they don't have any first strike weapons. You can call this preventive war. Second would be a use of those weapons in anticipation of an imminent enemy strike, use them before you lose them. This is known as pre-emptive strike, taking the initiative in the imminent situation that the alternative is to be struck or probably to be struck shortly, so this is thought of as a kind of retaliation or defense but it is called striking second first. It's taking the initiative and it does use the same capabilities you would use in a preventive war, but...so you understand that. This has always been U.S. policy and Russian policy from what we know of a Russian doctrine in their manuals. If you are about to be struck, you do not wait to be struck and the notion to the public that you wait till the warheads fall has never been the Air Force policy or presidential policy. The advantage of getting your weapons whether planes or missiles off the ground or for the enemy weapons....is felt to be so enormous that these plans have always been premised on doing that if you had the warning.

These presume to (inaudible) if you want another, depending on how you define...

Ellsberg Well, we're talking here...yes, they could but...let's say imminent and let's say by that a day or two or something. Yeah, sure, you could think, well, if this is coming a month from now, but that would still be in....preventive war. I'm saying basically a tactical...a period of time you expect the attack in a period of time related to the flight time of missiles and the preparation...hours

or minutes, or maybe a day, not weeks...we're not talking about weeks so this is (inaudible) A third one is what we're actually committed to do for NATO and have always been committed and that is in the event of a tactical nuclear war started by either side which is either stalemated or which we are losing we are committed to use of our strategic forces whether they have used theirs or whether they have any or not, and these plans existed before Russia had, in '47, before Russia had any nuclear forces. Our plans in those days were only for strike forces. There was no second strike. The Russians weren't expected to have nuclear weapons for years. We were multiplying our nuclear weapons for this purpose and we always had these plans. I'll call that an escalatory first strike. The two kinds then of uses of our forces, of our strategic forces...our practical...pre-emptive and escalatory and these two are related. The third we could initiate then in tactical use (inaudible) Paul ^{VITRE}~~Nitzah~~(?) who has as big an effect on all this structure as anybody or any other individual, in the present to now, and going back, of course, 1968, said in 1966 spelled out a lot of this in the following terms, it is very difficult, almost impossible for the country, any country, any government, he said, seriously to contemplate initiating the use of nuclear weapons--this was in an area now when the Soviets (inaudible)--without some reason to hope that the use will be unilateral. Can there be such a reason to hope in a world where both sides have nuclear weapons. Answer: yes, with a sufficient degree of superiority on the side usinginitiative. It has reason to hope that if it uses its weapons in a sufficiently limited way, say against an ally, not against the Soviet Union itself, in a very limited way against the Soviet Union, that its superiority backup here will keep the Soviets from replying at all. This I'm saying was (spelling) Nitzah's argument in '56 and I conjecture that this underlies the structure of our planning this idea right along. Now superiority if possible conveys what you're after, but I'll come now up to the present. I think there is a way to do it if they now conceive a way to do it without superiority in a strict sense, and

they have to have to do it without superiority because you can't get superiority (inaudible). Let me first divide now two phases of the nuclear era roughly for my purposes. In the first which lasted very much longer than anyone even Nitzah probably expected it could last, much longer than scientists on the whole or launch controllers and doves ever could imagine to last was a period of immense U.S. superiority. The Soviets made every effort to match us qualitatively as quickly as they could which was usually within three or four years. At having tested the capabilities, on most cases they tended not to buy large numbers of it. The exception was medium and intermediate range, but they did not buy the long-range bombers. They did not buy large numbers of (inaudible) or submarines, _____ missiles as late as 1961, so the new look period, the period of massive retaliation which looked so dangerous that no one could take it seriously at the time. You had to believe these were nothing but bluffs, rather implausible bluffs, and therefore risky. That was actually a period in which this...our superiority was vastly greater than almost anybody...including people at Rand (sp.?) *Imagine* and I'll give you a measure of that. In the year of the Berlin crisis in 1961...the final year of the Berlin crisis...that was the year of the predicted missile gap...in fact, in June of '61, the last missile gap predicted that the Russians...or estimated that the Russians then had a 120 ICBM's (sp.?) . This was the lowest estimate they'd had yet, 120. The State guessed 160, the Air Force said several hundred in a footnote, and actually the SAC commander was estimating to the President that they had 1,000 missiles of whose location we knew only 200. We then had 40 ICBM's

(End of Tape)